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In ‘Higher-order free logic and the Prior-Kaplan paradox’, Andrew Bacon, John Hawthorne, 
and Gabriel Uzquiano (BHU) explore various strategies for avoiding some disturbing results 
in higher-order logic derived by Arthur Prior (1961), David Kaplan (1995) and others, under 
apparently reasonable assumptions. Specifically, the results involve quantification into 
sentence position. In particular, they are derivable in systems of higher-order modal logic of 
the sort defended in MLM, so I cannot just say that they are not my problem. 
 Typical of the results is this: 
Prior’s Theorem Q p (Qp → ¬p) → p (Qp & p) & p (Qp & ¬p) 
Here Q is any sentence operator. For instance, we can read Q as ‘TW visibly wrote at 8.45 
that’, with reference to the morning on which I wrote this paragraph. Under this 
interpretation, roughly paraphrased in English, Prior’s theorem says that if TW visibly wrote 
at 8.45 that whatever TW visibly wrote at 8.45 is not so then something TW visibly wrote at 
8.45 is so and something TW visibly wrote at 8.45 is not so, and consequently TW visibly 
wrote at least two things at 8.45. 
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The main problem with Prior’s Theorem is not that it is beyond the remit of logic to 
give us this sort of information. As I argue in Modal Logic as Metaphysics, logic is defined by 
its generality, not by its neutrality or uninformativeness. Strong, informative theories are as 
valuable in logic as they are in any other science. The main problem with Prior’s theorem is 
much worse and more straightforward. It just looks to be false, under various 
interpretations including the one above. For, as I can assure the reader, a natural 
description of what happened at 8.45 on the morning I wrote this paragraph is this: TW 
visibly wrote that whatever TW visibly wrote at 8.45 is not so; TW visibly wrote nothing else 
(in the relevant sense). Given the natural description, TW visibly wrote only one thing at 
8.45, so the consequent of Prior’s theorem is false, while its antecedent is true. Thus Prior’s 
theorem looks to make false predictions about easily observable events. 
 On the face of it, the problem has nothing special to do with higher-order modal 
logic. Prior’s theorem contains no specifically modal operators, and the reading above on 
which it appears false was specified in non-modal terms. However, BHU develop modal 
aspects of the problem in several ways.  
First, BHU formulate various plausible-looking possibility claims that can be refuted 
by reasoning like that in the derivation of Prior’s theorem. For instance, if you doubt my 
description of what did happen at 8.45 this morning, but concede that it (metaphysically) 
could have happened that way, your concession is incompatible with the necessitation of 
Prior’s theorem, which is standardly derivable in higher-order modal systems, including 
mine. BHU use some plausible-looking generalized possibility claims as benchmarks in their 
search for higher-order modal systems that avoid Prior-like results: one can test systems for 
their consistency with such claims. However, since the original problem arose without 
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appeal to modality, we may reasonably hope for a non-modal explanation of what went 
wrong. For understanding the root of the problem, modality looks like one moving part too 
many, an unhelpful complication and distraction. 
 The second way in which BHU develop a modal aspect of the problem is by treating 
quantification into sentence position intensionally, modelling it in terms of quantification 
over sets of worlds, at least in some of the approaches they consider. That is also how 
Modal Logic as Metaphysics treats quantification into sentence position. However, that too 
is not essential to the underlying problem, as BHU show. The problem arises even if 
quantification into sentence position is treated extensionally, in effect as quantification over 
truth-values, since the consequent of Prior’s theorem then implies, for instance, that at 8.45 
I visibly wrote two very coarse-grained things that differ in truth-value. Equally, the problem 
arises even if quantification into sentence position is treated hyperintensionally, in effect as 
quantification over very fine-grained entities such as Fregean thoughts, since it still seems 
false that at 8.45 I visibly expressed in writing two Fregean thoughts that differ in truth-
value. Thus the underlying problem is robust on the dimension of fineness of grain in the 
interpretation of quantification into sentence position. The intensional approach is not to 
blame, though an adequate diagnosis must no doubt take account of the operative level of 
individuation. 
 BHU emphasize a third modal theme with reference to Modal Logic as Metaphysics. 
The first part of their paper constructs a variety of ingenious models to investigate ‘Fregean’ 
higher-order modal systems in which, as in the book, one avoids a Russellian hierarchy of 
ramifications within a given grammatical category. The sentential quantifiers are interpreted 
as ranging over intensions (in effect,sets of worlds). However, by contrast with the book, the 
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quantifiers do not mandatorily range over all intensions. Rather, they are restricted to a 
proper or improper subset of intensions; BHU restrict the term ‘proposition’ to intensions in 
that subset. The effect is to invalidate both the rule of universal instantiation and various 
comprehension principles, thereby undermining Prior’s proof of his theorem and most 
similar proofs. The result is a higher-order free modal logic. But although the domain of 
quantification is restricted, the restriction is not relativized to worlds. BHU are still doing 
constant domain semantics, as in the book. Thus sentential quantifier analogues of the 
Barcan formula and its converse and the necessity of existence are still valid. I derive those 
principles by universal instantiation, but they hold in BHU’s models even though universal 
instantiation does not. As BHU say, this pulls apart two strands of thought that go together 
very naturally in the argument of Modal Logic as Metaphysics: in their terms, ‘First that 
existence doesn’t modally come and go, and second, that existence comes cheap’. 
 A quick way to check the separation of the two strands is by considering models with 
only one world. In such models, there is no contingency at all, so trivially existence doesn’t 
modally come and go. But the domain of quantification may still be restricted, for instance 
to truths, so that existence isn’t cheap in BHU’s sense: in such models,  p p is true but        
p & ¬p false, so universal instantiation fails, and ¬(p & ¬p) is true but p ¬p false, so 
existential introduction fails. 
 However, ‘existence is cheap’ is a slightly misleading slogan for the aspect of the 
theory defended in Modal Logic as Metaphysics that BHU have in mind (although I do not 
think that they misunderstand the theory). Of course, some philosophers may use the word 
‘existence’ for an ‘expensive’ property, such as concreteness, that some things have and 
others lack, but that is irrelevant because the book explicitly avoids using the word 
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‘existence’ in its theorizing. The real issue must concern being something, on an unrestricted 
reading of that phrase at whatever order is in play. It is also irrelevant that, on my view, any 
individual is something in all possible circumstances, and likewise for any proposition, for 
that is just the claim that ‘existence doesn’t modally come and go’, with which BHU are 
contrasting the claim that ‘existence is cheap’. Rather, they seem to have in mind the 
unrestricted validity at all orders of the standard introduction rule for the unrestricted 
quantifier   and the standard elimination (instantiation) rule for the unrestricted quantifier 
 , according to the theory. But of course that validity does not mean that the rules can be 
applied to whatever has the syntactic appearance of an expression of the appropriate 
category. After all, it is no objection to the standard introduction rule for disjunction ( ) 
that A may be true while A B is not because (we may suppose) although B has the syntactic 
appearance of a sentence, it has never been assigned a meaning, so the disjunction too is 
semantically defective. Theorizing in any discipline, logic, physics, or anything else, is liable 
to go wrong when one does it in semantically defective terms. To speak for convenience 
with typical ambiguity: for any grammatical type whatsoever, unless an expression of that 
type is semantically defective, it has a semantic value of the appropriate kind (perhaps 
relative to an assignment), and an unrestricted quantifier of the same type ranges over all 
values of that kind, so the standard quantifier rules preserve truth (when applied to 
semantically non-defective expressions). None of this prejudges the question of how easy or 
hard it is for an expression of a given type to be semantically non-defective. With these 
clarifications, I will for simplicity continue using BHU’s phrase ‘existence is cheap’ for the 
claim that the standard quantifier rules are truth-preserving. 
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 In BHU’s sense, there are models in which existence doesn’t modally come and go 
but isn’t cheap. As they also note, the converse is much harder to make sense of: cheap 
existence modally coming and going. For if it sometimes modally goes, it is not as cheap as 
all that. More formally, the characteristic theses of higher-order necessitism are derivable 
from the standard higher-order rule of universal instantiation (the first-order case is 
trickier). 
 Although BHU construct various Fregean models in which the existence of 
propositions isn’t cheap, but doesn’t modally come and go, and various Priorian theorems 
are false, in the end they declare themselves pessimistic about the prospects for this 
strategy in defusing Prior-Kaplan paradoxes. For too many other plausible assumptions have 
to be given up in blocking all routes to the paradoxical conclusions. Within the Fregean 
framework, one can derive versions of the theorems from plausible principles about the 
closure of the class of propositions under various operations (6.1) or the supervenience of 
all truths on fundamental truths (6.2), or by making only minimal assumptions about the 
existence of propositions and consequently ruling out more complex but still apparently 
possible scenarios (6.3). Moreover, without the standard quantifier rules, higher-order 
quantifier are much less useful for enhancing the expressive power of the language (6.4 and 
6.5). One would have to be very confident indeed that the Priorian theorems have false 
readings to be willing to give up so much of higher-order logic in order to vindicate the 
legitimacy of those readings. 
 In section 7 of their paper, BHU consider strategies that reject universal 
instantiation, and so deny that existence is cheap, within a Russellian framework, ramifying 
either the quantifiers for a given grammatical category, or the attitude verbs (such as ‘write’ 
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and ‘think’) used to specify the paradox-generating readings of the operator Q, or both. 
Once again their conclusions are pessimistic: they provisionally judge the costs to outweigh 
the benefits. 
In concluding, BHU write ‘our own inclination is to take Prior’s results at face value’, 
so they incline to rejecting principles that conflict with them (section 8). But, as they say, 
‘There still remains the question of how to implement that discovery’. They suggest that we 
may still need to postulate ramifications of subtly different relations associated with a given 
attitude verb to explain why Prior’s results seem to fail, but without ramifying the 
quantifiers or postulating failures of universal instantiation. This direction of research is 
congenial to my own instincts. I have suggested such a non-logical version of indefinite 
extensibility in dealing with the semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes (Williamson 1998). 
The guiding abductive methodology is to keep the overall logical framework simple and 
strong, while explaining the paradoxes by allowing messier proliferation at the level of less 
general distinctions. That way one prevents the resultant restrictions from undermining the 
explanatory power of theories in other disciplines (such as the natural sciences), as they do 
when logical principles themselves are restricted in response to the paradoxes, and so have 
to be supplemented with numerous ad hoc assumptions in order to recover their full 
strength in scientific applications (Williamson 201X). 
That general methodology is applicable to the case BHU discuss, where someone 
restricts the rule of universal instantiation for quantification into sentence position by 
adopting some form of free logic instead. Thus by itself  p A no longer in general yields its 
instance A(B/p) (subject as always to the normal syntactic qualifications to prevent free 
variables in B becoming bound when B is substituted for p in A). To derive the instance in 
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free logic, one also needs an auxiliary premise such as q (Bq) (where q does not occur in 
B and   is the sentential analogue of identity), to ensure that B expresses a proposition in 
the domain of quantification.  
Now suppose that the background logic for a theory about some topic far from Prior-
Kaplan paradoxes employs quantification into sentence position. For instance, that might be 
the most economical way of understanding some talk of ‘conditions’ or the like in natural 
science, since (unlike first-order quantification) it avoids ascribing an apparatus of 
nominalizing and denominalizing devices to mediate between variables in name position 
and sentences; for a detailed account of how scientific applications of the mathematical 
theory of dynamical systems are naturally understood in terms of quantification into 
sentence position see Williamson 2016. Thus a scientific explanation of some phenomenon 
may involve deriving it from various theoretical assumptions that include generalizations of 
the form  p A. In applying those generalizations, the derivation will typically need to 
instantiate them. But, as we noted, in the free logical framework each such move generally 
requires postulating an auxiliary non-logical assumption of the form q (Bq). If such an 
assumption is justified at all, it will be by further auxiliary assumptions, such as that 
universal instantiation fails only where intentionality is involved and that the present 
phenomenon does not involve intentionality — odd-looking assumptions for an explanation 
in physics! Thus restricting universal instantiation to block Prior-Kaplan paradoxes has 
unfortunate repercussions in all sorts of cases far from those paradoxes. By contrast, 
ramifying the attitude verbs is far more local in its effects, since those verbs are absent from 
most theories in the natural sciences. 
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 Of course, such general methodological remarks alone do not satisfyingly explain 
away the apparent falsifications of predictions made by Prior’s theorem about observable 
events. I will not attempt to provide any such explanation here. However, I do suggest that 
an appropriate setting for such an explanation is likely to be an externalist theory of 
content, on which what, if anything, one has an attitude towards depends on many factors 
and preconditions that are utterly non-obvious to both oneself and others; they can only be 
uncovered through painstaking theoretical investigation. Such a setting helps reduce the 
shock of Prior’s results, although we are still very far from completely removing their sting.  
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